A Crooked Bridge Over Calm Waters ?
The Scenic bridge, the crooked bridge, whatever.... After negotiation with Singapore to jointly built the bridge has failed, Malaysia has announced that it will proceed to built a half “crooked” bridge across the Johore Straits to replace the existing causeway. The idea of the new bridge was the brainchild of the previous prime minister of Malaysia. The decision to unilaterally build the half brige into the middle of Johore Straits without Singapore's participation is bizzare and beyond my comprehension.
The local newspapers called the proposed “crooked” bridge the “scenic bridge”, and indirectly and sarcastically insinuated Singapore by saying that if Singaporeans want the bridge to be “straight” and “less scenic” , then Singaporeans must come to the “negotiation table” and “agree” to replace the existing causeway.
As a layman, I do not know much about international politics and face saving gestures. But as a Malaysian, I personally felt that it is a bit high handed for Malaysians especially the local newspapers to ridicule and insinuate our tiny southern neighbour. Please bear in mind, our southern neighbour do provide a lot of employment opportunities for Malaysians, both in the past and PRESENT. The way we muscled ourselves to bring Singapore to negotiation table reflect a culture of arrogant and insentivity, or what the hokkiens commonly called, “boh jin zheng” and “boh kar si”.
So, why do we want the bridge to be “Scenic” ? To show the world that the Malaysian bolihism are capable forgoing more petroleum rebates to ill afford the unnecessary wastages in luxury ? We want the bridge “crooked” to reflect to the world that Singaporeans are straight ?
What puzzled me is, we already have a Causeway that works perfectly fine ! Why can't we just built additional lanes to the existing causeway ? Why do we need to built a new bridge to replace it ? It doesn't made any economic sense to me at all. One one hand, the Malaysian government has been pleading with Malaysians that we have limited resources for development budget, that we need to tighten our belt, that we need to forgo our petroleum tax rebates, that we need to spend only on necessities, etc. etc. But on the other hand, why the government see it as a priority to unilaterally bulldozed the construction of the “half baked” bridge that serves no additional economic values ? Cakap tak serupa bikin ?
Why the urgency for unilateral actions ? Are we being over eager to award the project to the local consortium to start work when the both countries can not even see eye to eye to finalize the details ? We already have the longest bridge, the most beautiful airport, the tallest tower, etc.... Are we going after another trophy of “most crooked” Bridge in the world ?
5 comments:
sungguh globalisasi nyer..
As reported in The Star on 12th April 2006.
Malaysia scraps bridge project to replace causeway with Singapore
KUALA LUMPUR: The Malaysian government has decided to scrap a controversial bridge project to replace a causeway between Malaysia with Singapore.
The decision was announced by Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in a statement issued on Wednesday.
I logically opined that the kiasu neighbor do not want to the straits to be open for seafaring ships which will definately jeopadise their port business. It was also their intention to make shallow the strait by land reclamation at eastern portion.
Open Letter by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad
Fakta Mengenai Jambatan Bengkok
Saya menulis surat terbuka ini sebagai seorang rakyat Malaysia yang cintakan negara untuk sesiapa saja yang ingin membacanya.
Fakta-fakta yang terkandung dalam surat ini perlu saya hebahkan dengan cara ini kerana pada akhir-akhir ini tidak banyak lagi kenyataan saya yang disiarkan, sama ada oleh media massa elektronik atau cetak, walaupun mereka menghantar wakil untuk menghadiri sidang akhbar saya.
Mengenai isu di atas, saya telah menyatakan pandangan saya iaitu Kerajaan Malaysia telah gagal mempertahankan kedaulatan negara. Akibat daripada itu negara mengalami kerugian berbilion ringgit. Wang ini adalah wang rakyat.
Saya juga mahu rakyat faham sikap dan tindak-tanduk Kerajaan Singapura serta dakwaan Kerajaan Malaysia yang ia memberhentikan pembinaan jambatan itu kerana isu undang-undang dan kerana sentimen rakyat yang tidak sanggup menyerahkan ruang udara serta penjualan pasir kepada Singapura, dan ini disalahertikan secara sengaja bahawa rakyat tidak mahu jambatan. Rakyat mahu jambatan tetapi menolak syarat Singapura, kerana ia tidak berasas dan bukan hak Singapura.
Singapura sangat gemar mencetak surat-menyurat antara pemimpinnya dengan pemimpin Malaysia dengan tujuan membuktikan yang ia di pihak yang benar.
Kerajaan Malaysia sekarang percaya bahawa dengan tidak menyanggah kempen memutarbelitkan oleh Singapura, masalah yang dihadapi akan selesai dengan sendirinya. Tetapi ini angan-angan yang tidak akan jadi kenyataan.
Di dalam amalan diplomatik, surat-surat yang ditulis oleh suatu pihak dengan memetik persetujuan-persetujuan lisan yang kononnya dicapai di dalam rundingan tidak rasmi di kalangan pemimpin, adalah tidak sah.
Untuk menjadikan ianya sah, rundingan hendaklah dicatat dan dirakam dengan sempurna, disahkan dan ditandatangani oleh kedua-dua belah pihak. Kenyataan yang dibuat di dalam sidang akhbar oleh salah satu pihak tanpa pengesahan pihak satu lagi juga adalah tidak sah.
Encik Lee Kuan Yew, ketika dia menjadi Menteri Kanan Singapura, sangat gemar meminta diadakan pertemuan empat mata tanpa agenda yang sempurna dan kemudian merakamkan hasil pertemuan itu di dalam suratnya sendiri kepada pihak ketiga. ( Sila lihat Apendiks 1 )
Berdasarkan surat-surat itu juga, dia harap rakan sejawatnya akan menyetujui kandungannya dan oleh yang demikian terikat dengan kandungan surat-surat itu. Dia tidak mengambil kira jika catatannya tidak dianggap tepat dan tidak disahkan.
Saya menganggap apa-apa pun yang tidak menepati amalan diplomatik sebagai tidak sah. Tanggapan beliau adalah tanggapan beliau sahaja, tidak Iebih dan tidak kurang. Tindakannya mencetak surat-suratnya sebagai bukti bahawa saya telah bersetuju tidak bermakna sama sekali. Hanya jika saya membalas surat itu dan mengesahkan perkara-perkara tertentu, barulah perkara-perkara berkenaan boleh dianggap benar. Tetapi sama ada ia sah dan kita terikat dengannya, bergantung pada pengesahan dan persetujuan kedua-dua belah pihak, secara rasmi.
Berdolak-dalik mengenai apa yang disebut “pakej” dan ketidakmampuan mencapai sebarang persetujuan adalah kerana kelulusan yang berasaskan “pakej” tidak praktikal. Jika persetujuan tidak boleh dicapai mengenai mana-mana satu perkara maka persetujuan tidak boleh dicapai bagi semua perkara dalam pakej itu.
Atas sebab inilah yang saya mencadangkan dan Encik Goh Chok Tong bersetuju iaitu kita menyelesaikan perkara demi perkara secara berasingan. Ini siperakukan dan diterima oleh Encik Goh Chok Tong selaku Perdana Menteri melalui surat bertarikh Oktober 14 2002 (sila lihat Apendiks 2) yang antara lain menyebut;
“Pada penghujung pertemuan (di Hanoi) anda berkata kita perlu mencuba menyelesaikan isu air, lagi cepat lagi baik. Saya bersetuju....”
Tetapi di dalam surat yang sama, Encik Goh Chok Tong berkata;
“Oleh yang demikian, saya tidak menjangka menerima surat anda bertarikh 7hb Oktober pada l0hb Oktober di mana anda menyatakan “Malaysia telah memutuskan untuk tidak meneruskan pendekatan pakej……”
JAMBATAN
Setelah menolak pendekatan pakej, saya membuat jangkaan yang isu pembinaan jambatan tidak akan dikaitkan dengan sebarang isu lain. Saya menaruh harapan yang sangat tinggi apabila isu pembinaan jambatan disebutkan di dalam surat-surat Menteri Kanan Lee Kuan Yew dan Perdana Menteri Goh Chok Tong.
Dalam sepucuk surat (sila rujuk Apendiks I perenggan 6) kepada Tun Daim Zainuddin, Lee berkata;
“Mengenai cadangan Mahathir membina Jambatan Tambak, Perdana Menteri saya (Goh) bersetuju dengannya tetapi mencadangkan agar kita tidak merobohkan Tambak Johor.”
Nampaknya rakyat Singapura lebih menyetujui jika kedua-dua jambatan baru dan Tambak Johor ada. Ini tentulah tidak masuk akal kerana cadangan pembinaan jambatan baru adalah bertujuan membuka laluan di antara kedua-dua belah di Selat Tebrau supaya air boleh mengalir tanpa sekatan. Ia bukan bertujuan menambah kapasiti hubungan antara Singapura dan Johor. Jika ini berlaku, ia hanyalah satu kebetulan.
Satu lagi hujah menarik Encik Lee ialah (sekiranya Singapura bersetuju dengan pembinaan jambatan itu);
“Singapura akan menambak laut di sebelah wilayahnya hingga ke sempadan dengan Malaysia.” (rujuk Apendiks 3, surat Menteri Kanan Lee kepada Dr Mahathir bertarikh Sept 8, 2001)
Sempadan antara Singapura dan Malaysia di Selat Tebrau adalah dasar laut yang paling dalam. Bagaimanapun, bagi Tambak Johor sempadannya adalah di tengah-tengah jambatan. Jika Singapura menambak laut di sebelah wilayahnya sehingga ke sempadan, ia bererti hanya laut di sebelah Malaysia akan kekal. Jadi apa halnya dengan konsep sempadan berasaskan dasar laut paling dalam? Dalam surat yang sama kepada Daim (rujuk Apendiks I perenggan 12) , Menteri Kanan Lee berkata;
“Saya sentiasa memaklumkan inisiatif saya kepada Perdana Menteri saya. Dia (Perdana Menteri Goh) bagaimanapun, berkata dia menyerahkan hal ini kepada saya sehingga peringkat akhir apabila dia akan mengkajinya dengan teliti sebelum memberi sebarang persetujuan.”
Menteri Kanan Lee juga menulis ( Apendiks 1, perenggan 12) ; “semua nota atau surat yang saya hantar kepada anda dan kepada Mahathir dan sebaliknya perlulah dianggap sebagai Tanpa Prejudis (Without Prejudice) iaitu tidak akan ada sebarang perjanjian sehingga semua perkara dipersetujui dan ditandatangani oleh kedua-dua Perdana Menteri.”
Jelas bahawa Menteri Kanan Lee tidak diberi kuasa untuk memutuskan apa-apa kerana beliau perlu memaklumkannya kepada Perdana Menteri Goh untuk dikaji sebelum dipersetujui. Jika tidak, maka tidak akan ada sebarang persetujuan mengenai semua perkara sehinggalah diperakui dan ditandatangani oleh kedua-dua Perdana Menteri.
Dalam jawapan kepada cadangan saya agar terminal Keretapi Tanah Melayu dibina di Johor Baru, Menteri Kanan Lee, melalui surat bertarikh 10 Disember 2001 (sila rujuk Apendiks 4 , perenggan 10), berkata;
“Saya harap anda juga akan menimbangkan kepentingan jangka panjang dan nilai perkhidmatan KTM. Sejak tahun 1923 kereta api merupakan perhubungan yang sangat berharga …….. Saya rasa mengekalkan hubungan kereta api antara Kuala Lumpur dan Singapura menguntungkan kedua-dua buah Negara……... Bagaimanapun, oleh sebab KTM milik negara anda, Singapura akan mematuhi keputusan anda”.
Dalam surat ini, Menteri Kanan Lee berikrar mematuhi keputusan saya. Namun beliau boleh juga berkata Perdana Menteri Goh tidak bersetuju dan segala surat-menyurat kami adalah tanpa prejudis.
Namun begitu, apabila beliau atau Perdana Menteri Goh Chok Tong dan saya sendiri menurunkan pandangan-pandangan kami dalam bentuk tulisan, ia menggambarkan apa yang kami fikirkan. Tetapi oleh sebab ia dilakukan tanpa prejudis, kami tidak terikat dengan apa yang kami katakan.
Justeru itu, tidak timbul persoalan berdolak-dalik atau memindahkan tiang gol. Kedudukan tiang gol belum diputuskan. OIeh sebab apa yang dilakukan itu berasaskan konsep tanpa prejudis, maka ia tidak Iebih daripada cadangan sahaja.
Dalam surat bertarikh 11 April 2002 (rujuk Apendiks 5) Perdana Menteri Goh menyebut;
“Saya sekarang memutuskan untuk mengendalikan sendiri perbincangan kita mengenai pakej dua hala.”
Sekarang barulah seorang yang berkuasa bercakap (bagi pihak Singapura).
Di dalam apa yang boleh dianggap sebagai komitmen mutakhir, Perdana Menteri Goh menulis (kepada saya):
1. Bridge
“Di antara sebuah jambatan baru bagi menggantikan keseluruhan Tambak, dan yang menggantikan hanya bahagian di sebelah Malaysia, saya lebih suka kepada pilihan pertama.”
“Sebaik sahaja jambatan baru siap, Tambak bolehlah dirobohkan, yang mana saya gembira jika dilakukan selepas tahun 2007.” “Tetapi sekiranya anda mahu menggantikan Tambak di sebelah negara anda dengan sebuah jambatan dengan serta-merta, saya akan menyetujuinya, walaupun pada pendapat saya ini tidaklah ideal.”
Apakah kesimpulan yang boleh kita buat kepada kenyataan ini? Tidak pun disebut mengenai pasir dari Malaysia dan pembukaan ruang udara kepada kapal terbang tentera Singapura. Juga tidak disebutkan tentang nostalgia, hanya keutamaan supaya Tambak dirobohkan selepas tahun 2007.
Sekarang dihujahkan pula bahawa jika Malaysia sentuh paip yang membawa air ke Singapura, ia adalah tindakan perang (act of war). Adakah ini perisytiharan perang?
Peruntukan “Wayleave Agreement” dengan Singapura cukup jelas. Berikut adalah apa yang dipersetujui mengenai paip air;
“That the Licensee (Singapore) shall take full responsibility financially or otherwise for any alteration to the pipeline that may become necessary by reason of any alterations or improvements made or to be made on the Johor Causeway and on receiving not less than six months previous notice in writing from the Licensors (Malaysia) shall thereupon carry out the alteration in accordance with such notice and shall have no claim for any compensation.”
[“Bahawa Pemegang Lesen (Singapura) akan mengambil sepenuh tanggungjawab kewangan atau sebaliknya bagi sebarang pindaan kepada saluran paip apabila ia diperlukan untuk sebarang pengubahsuaian atau pembaikan atau yang diperlukan di Tambak sebelah negeri Johor dan apabila menerima notis bertulis enam bulan sebelumnya daripada Pelesen (Malaysia) akan melakukan pengubahsuaian itu seperti yang disebutkan di dalam notis tanpa sebarang tuntutan ganti rugi.”]
Perjanjian itu tidak menyebut mengenai hak Pemegang Lesen (Singapura) mengingkarinya. Peruntukan “akan melaksanakan pengubahsuaian” (Shall carry out the alteration) sangat jelas dan kuat. Singapura wajib melaksanakan pengubahsuaian itu. Tetapi jika Singapura ingkar, ia mungkin merupakan tindakan perang dan bukan sebaliknya.
Apabila kerja awal pembinaan jambatan dimulakan tidak ada protes dan tidak ada permintaan membeli pasir atau menggunakan ruang udara kita. Sekarang pembinaan jambatan di sebelah wilayah kita pun nampaknya tertakluk kepada syarat kita membekalkan berjuta meter padu pasir kepada Singapura untuk menambak laut dan membuka ruang udara kita kepada jet tentera udaranya. Daripada mana datang semua syarat ini? Apakah kaitan antara perluasan wilayah Singapura dengan kita membina jambatan di dalam wilayah kita sendiri?
Tindak-tanduk Singapura mengaitkan pembinaan jambatan di wilayah kita dengan tuntutan kita menjual pasir dan membuka ruang udara kepadanya tidak berasas sama sekali.
Mengapa Kerajaan Malaysia perlu bersetuju memberi pasir dan membuka ruang udara kepada Singapura, jika tidak terpaksa memberhentikan pembinaan jambatan bengkok di wilayah kita sendiri adalah di luar kemampuan saya memahaminya.
Adalah hak rakyat Malaysia tidak menjual pasir kepada Singapura atau membuka ruang udara kepadanya. Tetapi rakyat tidak pernah mengatakan yang mereka bersedia mengorbankan projek jambatan. Yang mereka tidak mahu adalah mengalah kepada tuntutan Singapura supaya kita menjual pasir dan membuka ruang udara. Mereka mahukan jambatan tetapi mereka juga mahu Kerajaan mereka menyanggah tuntutan Singapura kerana di segi undang-undang Malaysia tidak perlu melayan syarat-syarat Singapura.
Tindak-tanduk Singapura ini telah dijangkakan. Tetapi Kerajaan Malaysia gagal mempertahankan kedaulatan negara. Di samping itu, ia telah menyebabkan kerugian berbilion ringgit wang rakyat jelata.
Biarlah rakyat Malaysia, khasnya orang Melayu, Melayu Johor terutamanya, ingat bahawa lnggeris telah menipu Sultan untuk menyerahkan Singapura dengan percuma kepada mereka (Inggeris).
Seperti Pulau Pinang, Lumut dan Melaka, Singapura sepatutnya dikembalikan kepada kita apabila lnggeris melepaskan hak mereka. Tetapi Singapura telah menjadi begitu asing keadaannya sehingga ia tidak boleh lagi menjadi sebahagian daripada Malaysia.
Apakah Malaysia sekarang akan memberi lebih banyak tanah kepada Singapura supaya ia boleh memperluaskan wilayahnya dan menambah bilangan penduduknya? Menyerahkan dasar laut kita kepada Singapura tidak ada bezanya dengan memberikan bumi kita kepada Singapura. Kesudahannya ialah perluasan wilayah Singapura. Ia tidak ada bezanya dengan menyerahkan sebahagian daripada Johor untuk tujuan ini. Apakah kita begitu miskin sehingga kita perlu menjual sekeping bumi kita kepada orang lain?
Generasi rakyat Malaysia yang akan datang, sama ada Melayu atau Johor, akan menyumpah kita jika kita melakukan semua ini sedangkan kita berhak membina jambatan di atas bumi dan laut kita sendiri sebagai sebuah negara yang merdeka dan berdaulat.
Cukuplah kita menyerahkan Singapura (kepada Inggeris). Tidak perlulah kita menyerahkan lagi tanah kita kepada Singapura walaupun ada orang yang berpendapat kita hanya boleh membina jambatan di negara kita jika Singapura bersetuju.
Rakyat Malaysia tidak pernah mengatakan demikian. Janganlah ada sesiapa yang menyumbat hujah ke dalam mulut mereka semata-mata kerana orang itu takut untuk mempertahankan hak dan kedaulatan negara serta rakyat Malaysia.
Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad
19hb April, 2006
STATEMENT BY YBHG TAN SRI AHMAD FUZI BIN HJ ABDUL RAZAK, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE BRIDGE ISSUE
1. The proposed construction of a new bridge to replace the Johore
Causeway has created a lot of controversy and media coverage on the
issue continues to attract public attention.
2. As the coordinating Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
has been directly involved in the bilateral negotiations with
Singapore on the bridge proposal. I wish to clarify some of the major
issues including the chronological events surrounding the bridge
proposal so as to put them in the proper perspective.
3. In addressing the issue, I wish to highlight in particular the
confusion pertaining to the proposal for a full straight bridge and
the alternative proposal for a scenic half bridge (termed crooked by
the media) and the scenic full bridge; thepolitical and legal
dimensions pertaining to the proposed unilateral construction of a
scenic half bridge by Malaysia including Singapore’s position; the
bilateral negotiations involving sand and airspace as trade-offs and
the Malaysian Government’s decision not to finally proceed with any
bridge proposal.
4. To begin with, the idea of building a bridge to replace the
Johore Causeway was first announced by the Government during the
launching of the Johore Bahru Waterfront City by YABhg. Tun Dr
Mahathir Mohamed, then Prime Minister of Malaysia on 5 July 1996. It
was clear that the bridge that Malaysia had in mind then was a full
straight bridge.
5. Malaysia had originally treated the proposed bridge issue as
outside the four package of outstanding bilateral issuesnamely water,
Points of Agreement (POA), Central Provident Fund (CPF) and airspace
as agreed upon between YABhg. Tun and the then Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong of Singapore on 17 December 1998 in Hanoi. The course of events
however, made it difficult for the bridge issue to be discussed
separately from the other outstanding issues in the package.
6. Bilateral negotiations through the exchange of letters,
Four-Eyed Meetings between YABhg. Tun as Prime Minister and Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Meetings at Senior Officials and Ministerial
level during the period of March 1999 to September 2002 failed to
reach agreement on various technical aspects of the bridge proposal as
well as other issues within the package.
7. YABhg. Tun then wrote to Senior Minister LeeKuan Yew on 4
March 2002 on the package of issues covering water, bridge and rail
including water pipelines, Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ),
CPF and air space. The Government’s proposal on the road bridge,
railway bridge and water pipelines issues are as follows:-
A new bridge will be built to replace the Causeway. Malaysia will
build the bridge on the Malaysian side at its own cost while Singapore
will build the bridge on the Singapore side at its own cost. The
bridge will connect at the common boundary in the Straits of Johore.
Once the bridge is completed, the Causeway will be demolished.
Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge on its side,
Malaysia intends to build the bridge on the Singapore side at its own
cost. The new bridge will jointhe remaining Causeway on Singapore’s
side. Once the bridge is completed, the Causeway on the Malaysian side
will be demolished.
Malaysia will build a new railway bridge across the Johore Straits.
This railway bridge will include a railway swing bridge on the part of
the Johore Straits that will be deepened for navigational purposes.
Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge to replace the
Causeway on its side, Malaysia will build a railway on its side in the
Johore Straits. This railway bridge will include a railway swing
bridge on the part of the Johore Straits that will be deepened for
navigational purposes. The new railway bridge will join existing
railway track on the remaining Causeway on Singapore’s side.
New water pipelines on the Malaysian side will be installed by
Malaysia and will reconnect with the Singapore water pipelines under
the new bridge.
Should Singapore decide not to build the bridge to replace the
Causeway on its side, the new water pipelines on the part of the
Johore Straits that will be deepened for navigational purposes will be
buried under the seabed and will reconnect with the Singapore water
pipelines.
8. On 11 April 2002 the then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong conveyed Singapore’s response vide a letter to YABhg. Tun on the
outstanding issues covering bridge, railway, water, CPF and air
space. On the bridge issue, Singapore’s position was asfollows:
“Between a new bridge to replace the entire Causeway, and one to
replace just the Malaysian side of the Causeway. I like the former
better. Once the new bridge is completed, the Causeway can be knocked
down, which I prefer to be done after 2007. But if you wish to proceed
immediately to replace just your side of the Causeway with a bridge, I
shall accept it, though I think this is not ideal.”
9. Two Ministerial Meetings were held in July and September 2002
to further discuss the outstanding issues within the package. As no
agreement was reached, YBhg. Tun wrote to the then Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong on 7 October 2002 inter alia as follows:-
“As you are aware, since our above decision, several meetings both at
Ministerial and officials levels, had been held on the package of
issues. Regrettably, three rounds of talks at the senior officials
level in 1999 and two Ministerial-level Meetings in 2002 did not meet
with any success.
In addition Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew also had several sessions
with me discussing the same package but no agreement could be reached.
I think we have now come to a point where it would be important for us
to prioritise our discussions. The approach that both sides had
adopted so far in dealing with the outstanding issues in a package,
has not yielded any meaningful results. In view of this, Malaysia has
now decided to discontinue the packageapproach and to give the
highest priority to first resolving the long-delayed water issue,
particularly the price review of raw water. Once this issue is
satisfactorily and amicably resolved, I am confident that Malaysia and
Singapore would be able to move forward much faster in finding
solutions to the other outstanding issues that stand in the way of our
bilateral relations.”
10. Singapore’s reaction was reflected in the then Prime Minister
Goh Chok Tong’s letter to YABhg. Tun on 14 October 2002 when he
decided to withdraw the concession that he said Singapore was prepared
to make as trade-offs involving the bridge and other issues under the
package. Singapore later further explained in a Diplomatic Note dated
29 November 2004 that the agreement given by the then Singapore Prime
Minister “was made in the context of the then ongoing negotiations
between the twoGovernments as an overall package of bilateral issues.
With the termination of the package negotiations the underlying basis
for the statements in the letter of 11 April 2002 no longer exists”.
11. A legalistic approach was taken by Singapore when Malaysia
decided to proceed with the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ)
Complex at Bukit Chagar and the unilateral construction of the scenic
half bridge and new railway bridge projects on the Malaysian side of
the Johore Causeway after giving the necessary contracts to Gerbang
Perdana Sdn Bhd in 2003. In its Diplomatic Note dated 25 October 2003
Singapore referred to the Order of 8 October 2003 International
Tribunal On the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the case concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johore and
contended that Malaysia had made a unilateral decision in announcing
the proposedconstruction of the scenic half bridge. It maintained that
international facilities such as the Causeway cannot be demolished
without its approval, agreement and involvement of both states and
there should be mutual cooperation and consultation on the management
of the Johore Straits.
12. Singapore’s position on Malaysia’s CIQ complex and the scenic
half bridge and new railway projects was finally reflected in its
decision with regard to the relocation of Singapore Public Utilities
Board (PUB) water pipelines. It effectively invoked PUB’s ownership of
the water pipelines as provided for under the 1961 and 1962
Johore-Singapore Water Agreements that was subsequently guaranteed
under the 1965 Separation Agreement between Malaysia and Singapore.
13. In giving itslegal opinion, the Attorney General’s Chambers
confirmed the above interpretation with respect to PUB’s ownership of
the water pipelines under the 1961 and 1962 Johore-Singapore Water
Agreements and “that Malaysia is required to obtain prior approval of
PUB in relation to the alteration of the water pipelines necessitated
by the construction of a bridge, whether it is a full straight bridge
or a scenic bridge (half bridge)”.
14. Taking advantage of the above Agreements, Singapore made a
clear distinction between the relocation of PUB water pipelines on
mainland Johore and the relocation of PUB water pipelines along the
Malaysian part of the Johore Causeway in relation to the construction
of the scenic half bridge. In a Note dated 29 November 2004 Singapore
maintained that in facilitating its relocation of the water pipelines
on Johore mainland, it was prepared to decoupleconstruction of the new
CIQ complex from the proposal to build a new bridge and treat the two
projects as severable from each other. In other words, approval for
the relocation of the water pipelines on mainland Johore was given by
Singapore only upon obtaining Malaysia’s clarifications that the
relocation of the PUB water pipelines was solely for the construction
of the new CIQ complex. The relocation of the PUB water pipelines
along the Malaysian part of the Johore Causeway in relation to the
unilateral construction of the scenic half bridge however would be
treated as a different issue altogether.
15. After taking over the Prime Ministership on 30 October 2003,
YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi visited Singapore on 12 January
2004. The bridge issue was not specifically discussed but YAB the
Prime Minister urged both sides to tackle the issues that are easier
to resolvefirst. He explained the approach by using the metaphor of
“plucking the ripe fruit first,” whereby both sides should pluck the
low hanging fruit first, and then move on to the higher ones on the
tree. He subsequently urged both sides to explore new approaches and,
“to think out of the box” in order to avoid the previous deadlock that
besieged their bilateral negotiations.
16. YAB Dato’ Seri Prime Minister’s above visit paved the way for
an improved political climate of cooperation with both sides
expressing the desire to amicably resolve the outstanding issues. It
was in this context that related works pertaining to the scenic bridge
and the railway bridge were suspended on 5 February 2004.
17. During the visit of Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
toMalaysia on 4–5 October 2004, both sides agreed to revisit the full
straight bridge proposal, as originally conceived by YABhg. Tun, by
resuscitating negotiations on the issue. In this context, YAB Dato’
Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi reiterated the rationale behind Malaysia’s
proposal including the need to allow free flow of water so as to
improve water quality in the Straits of Johore, to overcome traffic
congestion on the Causeway and to allow navigation and promote
commercial and recreational activities along the Straits.
18. The full straight bridge proposal was again raised by YAB Dato’
Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during the two visits of Senior Minister
Goh Chok Tong to Malaysia on 13 December 2004 and 1 March 2005
respectively. During the first visit, Malaysia officially presented
the design of the full straight bridge for Singapore’s consideration.
Singaporecontinued to maintain that the bridge would bring no benefits
to Singapore in return for the S$725 million that it would have to
allocate for its part of the project. He nevertheless suggested that
it would be easier for Singapore to favourably consider Malaysia’s
proposal if it were to lift the ban on the export of sand to Singapore
that was imposed on 15 January 1997 and reinstate all the rights with
regard to the use of Malaysia’s airspace that had been withdrawn on 16
September 1998. This was the first time that sand was linked by
Singapore to the bridge issue. Singapore was previously enjoying the
supply of sand from Malaysia by using the private sector.
19. To move forward with further discussions, both sides agreed for
Senior Officials to meet as a follow up. A Ministerial Level Meeting
was also proposed. Malaysia subsequently took the initiative to send a
technicalteam to Singapore to give a technical briefing on the full
straight bridge proposal on 28 January 2005. Singapore merely took
note of the briefing without giving any specific commitments.
20. It was against the above backdrop that five meetings were held
by Senior Officials of both sides between 7 September 2005 to 11 March
2006. Focus was given on the full straight bridge proposal with
appropriate video presentation made to the Singapore delegation as a
way of persuading Singapore to appreciate the merits of such a
proposal. The Malaysian delegation’s approach was to discuss the full
straight bridge proposal as a stand alone issue based on its merits.
In this regard, the Malaysian side even offered to Singapore the
possibility of Malaysia considering to bear the entire cost for the
construction of the bridge in return for Singapore’s agreement without
linking it to otherissues.
21. It was obvious from the very first meeting that Singapore was
more interested to negotiate on the basis of balance of mutual
benefits involving sand and airspace. Singapore also preferred to
build the bridge on a cost sharing basis if agreement was reached
between the two sides. It subsequently dawned on the Malaysian
delegation that, short of calling off of the Meeting altogether,
progress could only be achieved on the basis of the balance of mutual
benefit principle.
22. Armed with expert advice from the relevant Agencies and the
mandate given by the Cabinet, the Malaysian delegation crafted a
“Broad Political Understanding” (BPU) that incorporated elements
constituting the balance of benefits, in respect of the bridge
proposal. The BPU, agreed uponin principle, was not a final document
and was subjected to the approval of the respective Governments. It
was intended to provide the basis for follow up detailed technical and
legal negotiations with a view to concluding a Final Agreement to be
approved by the respective Governments.
23. In including sand as an element in the BPU, consideration was
given to Malaysia’s precedent in exporting sand to Singapore, the
quality and quantity available, location, royalty, issuance of
license, State and Federal Government procedures, rules and
regulations pertaining to the dredging of sand, related terms and
conditions and the need for effective enforcement to prevent the
illegal supply of sand to Singapore.
24. With regard to airspace, Singapore’s request was notsomething
new as Malaysia had previously granted five privileges to RSAF before
they were withdrawn in 1998. Singapore wanted Malaysia to reinstate
all the privileges that it used to enjoy but with Ministry of
Defence’s approval only two such privileges namely, Search and Rescue
and Northern Corridor Transit, were considered. Even then the Search
and Rescue privilege was offered on the basis of reciprocity. The
Northern Transit Corridor privilege would also not involve RSAF’s
permanent presence in Malaysia’s airspace but merely a technical
presence for transit purposes.
25. At all times during the discussions, account was taken of the
need to protect Malaysia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and
national interest in applying the principle of balance of mutual
benefits.
26. The Government decided to give itself some time before deciding
on the BPU considering the socio-political dynamics prevailing within
the country. The Barisan Nasional MPs were accordingly given a
briefing on 28 March 2006 by YB Minister of Foreign Affairs to clarify
the various options available to the Government. At the back of the
Government’s mind was the need to make a final decision that would
reflect a consensus amongst the people of Malaysia. This was very
much in accordance with the principle, approach and conduct of the
present leadership in dealing with important issues of interest to the
Malaysian public.
27. To be more specific, the Government had Four Options to
consider:-
i) The first option wasto approve the BPU and
proceed with detailed negotiations to conclude a Final Agreement. The
BPU could be considered as the least objectionable compromise to
secure a full straight bridge to be left as a legacy for future
generations. As a strong Government with more than a two thirds
majority in Parliament, the Government could have gone ahead with the
BPU and subsequently persuade Malaysians to accept the compromise as
they begin to enjoy the convenience of a new full straight bridge
after its completion.
The problem however, was to obtain a clear consensus in the short
term, taking into account public sentiments and the lingering concern
of being seen to be giving in too much to Singapore for the sake of a
bridge to replace the Johore Causeway.
Malaysiacould have offered to Singapore other concessions
instead of sand and airspace. However, considering Singapore’s present
immediate needs, no other concessions other than these two could be
more important to Singapore.
(ii) The second option was to proceed with the scenic half bridge
that would join the Singapore part of the Johore Causeway. The scenic
bridge would be within Malaysia’s territory and a simplistic
consideration would suggest this to be an appropriate alternative to
the full straight bridge.
The biggest problem however, based on expert advice is the need to
consult and obtain the necessary approval of Singapore for the
relocation of PUB water pipelines in the context of the 1961 and 1962
Water Agreements and the 1965 Separation Agreement mentioned above.As
a responsible member of the international community Malaysia has to
abide by the various principles of international law.
Going by Singapore’s known position there is no assurance that
Singapore would not request for a balance of interests involving sand
and airspace before considering its approval and extending its
cooperation in respect of the relocation of the pipelines along the
Malaysian part of the Johore Causeway for the construction of a scenic
half bridge. If it comes to this during negotiations with Singapore,
it would be highly regrettable if Malaysia has to concede on sand and
airspace in return for a scenic half bridge instead of a full straight
bridge.
As pointed out by the Attorney General’s Chambers, Singapore could
even halt the usage of theremaining Singaporean part of the Causeway
by KTM on account of structural integrity upon the unilateral
demolishment of the Malaysian part of the Causeway. This will
directly affect the running of railway services to Singapore. Should
this subsist for six months, it would attract section 4 of the
Singapore Railway Transfer Ordinance (Chapter 320) and “Singapore
Railway Land” (namely, KTM lands) will revert to Singapore.
(iii) The third option was to unilaterally build a scenic half
bridge that could eventually be linked to become a full scenic bridge
with Singapore. The same arguments as in (ii) above could apply. There
is in addition no guarantee that Singapore would agree to build its
side of the bridge without a balance of interests within the period of
construction of Malaysia’s part of the bridge. This element of
uncertainty would mean that Malaysia would eventuallyend up having to
proceed with a scenic half bridge or an incomplete half bridge
“waiting” to be linked by Singapore at its pleasure. Such a “hanging
bridge” would no doubt become a subject of ridicule that would affect
the image of Malaysia as a whole.
(iv) The fourth option was not to proceed with any
bridge at all. This was finally the decision taken by the Government.
If a compromise is considered too much under the first option in view
of strong public sentiments, this should be the best option.
This option means that Malaysia need not have to consider lifting the
ban on the export of sand and granting to RSAF the limited privileges
in the use of its airspace vis-a-vis Search and Rescue and Northern
Corridor Transit. Malaysia can now even consider imposing a complete
ban on the export of sand to anycountry as a matter of policy if
public sentiments on the issue is as strong as reflected in the media.
Such a policy, backed by an appropriate national legislation, would be
a strong deterrent to prevent the illegal export of sand.
The Government’s decision to scrap the bridge project would also have
the advantage of preventing the two sides from being embroiled in
endless political bickering and legal disputes. The decision is not
necessarily a win-lose situation. Malaysia did not really lose even if
it did not get the bridge. Singapore too did not look at Malaysia’s
decision in terms of victory or defeat. After all, Singapore too did
not get what it wanted in respect of sand and airspace.
28. The Government believes that building a bridge to connect
twoneighbouring countries should serve to promote friendly
people-to-people contacts and interaction. Undertaking the unilateral
construction of a bridge by having to resort to political and legal
wrangling and disputes are not necessarily the best way to promote
bilateral relations. The Government’s decision, as stated by YAB the
Prime Minister himself, was a political decision, a collective
decision made by the Cabinet, taking into account all relevant
factors. It is indeed the prerogative of the Government of the day to
make such a decision. Organising a referendum and making a decision on
the basis of such a referendum has never been the practice of the
Government nor a tradition in Malaysia.
29. Given all the above considerations, circumstances and
complexities, the political decision collectively made by the Cabinet
was ultimately the best decision in support ofMalaysia’s national
interest.
30. An important lesson can certainly be drawn by this bridge
episode. Bilateral negotiations between Malaysia and Singapore
continue to be affected by public sentiments and emotions associated
with the historical baggage arising from Singapore’s 1965 Separation
from Malaysia. More must certainly must be done by both sides to allow
the two countries to move ahead in nurturing mutually beneficial
cooperative relations.
31. With the decision taken by the Government not to proceed with
the bridge proposal and the contract given to the relevant company to
complete the facilities linking the Causeway to the new CIQ complex in
Johore Bahru, Malaysia’s interest would now be better served by
devoting all efforts towards ensuring the maximumutilization of the
facilities concerned.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wisma Putra
Putrajaya
24 April 2006
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